Abstract. This paper, based on the incomplete information game theory, analyzes the direct bilateral bidding transactions between electric power generator and electric power consumer. Then, we analyze the existence of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium solutions. The analysis result manifests that it is of obvious benefits for the electric power producer to use game theory to guide their bidding strategies. And this article can also provide some policy guidance for China's electricity market reforms.
Introduction
In the recent years, with the coal prices rising sharply, the electricity generation enterprises' profit decreased so much. Generating more electric power cannot lead to more gains; what's worse, it may lead to even losses. Therefore, the electric power shortage is not due to inadequate power generation capacity. Because the contradictions between electric power price determination mechanism and coal price determination mechanism for that the coal price level is determined by the market supply and demand levels, compared with that, the electric power price level is determined by the government considering the importance of electric power to the national constructions. The high electric coal demand, largely results in the existence of large amount of high energy-consuming small coal-fired power plants. At present, the national unit capacity of power stations of which the single-machine capacity is less than 13.5 million kilowatts still remains about 140 million kilowatts. The average coal consumption generating one kilowatt-hour of these units is larger than one hundred and fifty grams compared with the larger units. National coal production capacity would quickly achieve balance between supply and demand if the small power generation capacity units were alternated by large ones. It is crucial reason for the current coal-fired contradiction that China's electric power trading and scheduling is not reasonable.
It is imperative to improve the electricity power transaction and scheduling mode, put the power buyer and power seller having trade directly into practice to decrease the intermediate transaction costs. Game theory is the powerful analysis tool when dealing with the direct transactions between the power producer and power buyer. Taking the actual market into account, the electric power producer and the electric power buyer haven't grasped each other's information completely; we will analyze the direct transactions between power seller and power buyer based on the incomplete information game theory.
The Methodology of Incomplete Information Game Theory
The general description of N-person incomplete information game theory can be expressed as The expected utility of game player i is defined as below:
Had the above definitions, the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be expressed as below:
The pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of N-person incomplete information static game theory is a type-contingent strategy combination 
is satisfied for every game player i.
Model Simplification and Bidding Decision-Making Analysis of Electricity Market
Game Model in Electricity Market. There are three ways for making electric power price; individual cost pricing method, standard cost pricing, market-pricing method. Individual cost pricing method is essentially a "cost plus" model. This kind of electric power price is consists of all the costs, expenses, tariff and a certain amount of Return of Investment. The standard cost pricing method is essentially the "same electric net, the same quality, the same price" mode. This kind of power pricing method sets the power price according to different electric power quality. Market pricing method is this kind of method in which the price is determined by competition. However, in this article, the electric power price is determined by both bidding price of the power buyer and the asking price of the power seller.
Here are some assumptions for our modeling:
(1)The cost of the electric power seller is random variable c; the value of the electricity to the buyer is random variable v. c and v subject to the uniform distribution, and the lower limit is 0, the upper limit is 1.
[
The distribution function (.) P is the common knowledge. (2) The electric power seller asking price for the electric power while electricity buyer bid price for the electric power at the same time. s P , ranging from 0 to 1, is the bidding price of electricity power seller. Accordingly, b P , ranging from 0 to 1, is the bidding price of the electricity power buyer; The utility function of the buyer and seller can be expressed as below; 
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The Algorithm Convergence and the Existence of the Nash Equilibrium. In the case of incomplete information, only power seller knows that c, the power buyer knows that v for that c is the seller's type and v is the buyer's type. In this Bayesian Nash equilibrium, s p , the strategy of power 
is buyer's expectancy bidding price of the seller under the conditions that the seller's asking price is lower than the buyer's bidding price.
In order to facilitate the discussion of the model, we consider the following linear strategy equilibrium: 1 more incentive to generate electric power. This will help us to deal with the electric power shortage resulting from the lacking of economic incentive to generate electric power. Such an attempt will truly lead electric trading market into market-oriented but not government-oriented.
However, there are still some questions need to be resolved. In general, any transaction would promote the Pareto efficiency if the product value to the buyer is greater than the product cost to the seller. However, in the bilateral transactions, none of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium can make Pareto efficient transactions happen definitely and only. So maybe the transaction will never occur even though the value to the buyer is greater than the cost to the seller. Yet, it is Pareto efficient. So, how to ensure each transactions completed is also worthy of further research in the basis of bilateral transactions.
